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The Presumption of Resulting Trust: A New Era? 
 
This entry is written in anticipation of the forthcoming appeal against the recent 
High Court judgment in Mak Saw Ching v Yam Hui Min, Barbara 
Rebecca [2014] SGHC 212.  The appeal shall provide a further opportunity for 
the Court of Appeal to clarify and refine the law on the presumption of resulting 
trust after the important decision of Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 
SLR 1048 released earlier this year.  However, the High Court judgment is not 
to be missed as well.  The decision highlights interesting issues for the appellate 
bench’s consideration, and could be the forerunner of a new era for the 
presumption of resulting trust under Singapore law.   
 
Facts and Decision  
 
The dispute arose between a paternal grandmother and her granddaughter 
concerning the beneficial ownership of a Housing and Development Board 
(“HDB”) flat (“the property”) for which they were registered as legal 
owners.  The case belied acrimonious family relations that ensued from a bitter 
divorce between the granddaughter’s parents.  Prior to the divorce, and 
pursuant to the grandfather’s demise, the grandmother conveyed the property 
into the joint names of the granddaughter and herself as joint tenants, for 
“natural love and affection” as stated in the transfer document.  However, after 
the irretrievable breakdown of the granddaughter’s parents’ marriage and the 
granddaughter moving out of the property with her mother, the grandmother 
severed the joint tenancy, making them tenants in common in equal shares. 
    
The grandmother then applied to court for a declaration that the granddaughter 
held her half-share on trust for the grandmother.  The grandmother asserted 
that she had no intention to make a gift of the property to the granddaughter; 
instead, the transfer into their joint names was executed as part of her 
succession plan for her son, the granddaughter’s father.  She claimed the 
granddaughter had made no financial contributions to the purchase or 
maintenance of the property, nor did she stay in it.  Upset with the 
granddaughter siding with the mother in the divorce, the grandmother 
therefore no longer trusted her and wanted to remove her name from the title 
to the property.   The grandmother’s primary case was that she intended to 
create an express trust appointing the granddaughter as the trustee to hold her 
interest in the property for her father.  As this trust would be void by reason of 
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section 51(8) of the HDB Act, an automatic resulting trust arose in favour of the 
grandmother.  Her alternative case was that there was an unrebutted 
presumption of resulting trust, which arose in favour of the grandmother; but 
this resulting trust, which arose by operation of law, did not offend section 51(8) 
of the HDB Act.   Her further alternative submission was that the voluntary 
conveyance could be set aside for mistake of law as she was mistaken that the 
transaction to benefit the father was illegal.    
 
In defence, the granddaughter contended that the grandmother had intended a 
gift as they had a close relationship, claiming that the presumption of resulting 
trust could be rebutted by the presumption of advancement. She further 
submitted that the grandmother’s case based on express trust or a resulting 
trust would fail because these trusts would be void under section 51 of the HDB 
Act.  Notwithstanding the dispute concerned issues of factual dispute, owing to 
costs concern, both sides agreed to proceed without cross-examination of the 
material witnesses.     
 
On the grandmother’s primary case, the High Court found that the 
grandmother had failed to prove that she created an express trust based on the 
unchallenged evidence, in particular, when taken against the undisputed 
documentary evidence that the transfer of the property was for “natural love 
and affection”.    
 
As for her alternative case based on the presumption of resulting trust, The 
Court, following See Fong Mun, said that the presumption of resulting trust 
ought not be invoked in the present case because “both parties had ample 
opportunity to, and did in fact, adduce evidence of the [grandmother’s] actual 
intentions when making the transfer” (at [45]). Moreover, the Court noted that 
the presumption of resulting trust argument would be inconsistent with her 
primary case. Even if the presumption had applied, the Court would have found 
that the presumption had been rebutted, taking heed from the Court of Appeal’s 
observations in Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR 108 that 
the strength of the presumption would vary with the facts of each case.  In fact, 
the High Court went as far as to observe that local courts should apply the 
presumption of resulting trust “with circumspect in cases of gratuitous 
transfers” (at [49]) as it must accord with “modern societal values and 
expectations” (at [48]).   In its view, the modern societal expectations of a 
gratuitous transfer would be that it was indeed intended to be a gift.  The weight 
to be ascribed to the presumption was further depreciated by the fact of a close 
relationship between the parties at the time of the transfer.  The strength of the 
presumption of resulting trust, even if it arose on the facts of the case, was thus 
a weak one.  
 
Finally, on setting aside the transfer on the basis of mistake, the Court observed 
that this claim was not included in the application but was raised belatedly.  In 
any event, given its conclusion that the grandmother had failed to prove the 
express trust, the mistake argument – which depended on the express trust 
claim – would be “wholly untenable” (at [56]).  The Court further noted that the 
grandmother had failed to explain how the setting aside of the transfer for 
mistake would defeat the granddaughter’s title to the property.   
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As the appeal is pending, the decision need not detain us for long, save for two 
general points to highlight what the interesting issues that the Court of Appeal 
might take up.   
 
Modern application of the presumption of resulting transfer 
 
Mak Saw Chin has expressly endorsed that the modern societal expectation is 
that a gratuitous transfer is intended as a gift.  However, as the judicial abolition 
of the presumption of resulting trust has been deemed inappropriate, the High 
Court encapsulates this modern social experience within the presumption of 
resulting trust by way of diminishing the strength of the presumption in such a 
context.  If this position is affirmed by the Court of Appeal, it would mean that 
in practice, parties effecting gratuitous transfers but not intending a gift must 
take steps to ensure that their intentions are clear. 
   
That being the case, one should not take this to mean that a sharp distinction is 
drawn between a gratuitous transfer and a non-gratuitous transfer, and that the 
strength of the presumption is only significantly diminished in respect of its 
operation in the former case.  After all, the factual distinction might be minimal 
if a case of non-gratuitous transfer involves a 90:10 ratio of contributions by the 
parties.   That the presumption is preserved in the context of gratuitous 
transfers should serve to remind this.  The decision should thus be read as part 
of the evidence of the general decline of the presumption of resulting trust 
under Singapore law, instead of evidence of its decline in a specific context.  It 
also follows that Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 should be 
viewed as a decision that refused to adopt the framework of analysis laid down 
by the majority in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 in respect of domestic 
consumer cases for fear of uncertainty, instead of one that stressed the modern 
importance of the presumption of resulting trust.  
 
Moreover, in Mak Saw Chin, the Court took into account the parties’ closeness 
of relationship as another factor in determining the strength of the 
presumption.  But one wonders, on further reflection, whether this factor ought 
to be part of the evidence taken to rebut the presumption of resulting trust, as 
opposed to a factor to determine the strength of the presumption.   The 
distinction has important practical implications.  In a case where the 
presumption of advancement also arises, pursuant to Lau Siew Kim (at [78]), 
the state of the relationship is one of the two key factors (the other being nature 
of the relationship) in determining the strength of the presumption of 
advancement.  Analytically, the same factor would be considered at both stages, 
somewhat redundantly and unnecessarily.  Even in a case where the 
presumption of advancement does not arise, the party asserting a gift might 
have no other evidence to support his/her case save for the evidence on the state 
of the relationship which would suggest that a gift is more probable.  Scant 
evidence is not unusual in the familial setting where parties do not ordinarily 
document their intentions as commercial parties do.  If this factor is taken into 
account in determining the strength of the presumption of resulting trust, the 
presumption, although weak, remains unrebutted.  On the other hand, taken as 
part of the evidence to rebut the presumption of resulting trust, the party 
asserting a gift has a chance at rebutting it in an appropriate case.  
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Setting aside a voluntary transfer on the ground of mistake  
 
It is not clear if the mistake argument will be seriously pursued before the Court 
of Appeal.   It is not improbable that the Court of Appeal might find this claim 
hopeless and for the same reasons as the High Court did.  Outcome of the 
argument aside, what might pique the interest of the legal community is the 
Court of Appeal’s consideration of the law on setting aside a voluntary transfer 
for mistake.  Specifically, the question is whether Singapore law would follow 
the English approach most recently enunciated in Pitt v Holt; Futter v 
Futter [2013] 2 AC 108.  According to Lord Walker, who delivered the single 
judgment of the UK Supreme Court, the test is a causative mistake of sufficient 
gravity.  On the issue of gravity, Lord Walker said that its determination is 
based on the injustice or unconscionability of not setting aside a mistaken 
disposition, and this involves an objective assessment of the facts of each case, 
including: (a) the circumstances of the mistake; (b) the consequences of the 
mistake on the settlor; (c) any relevant change of position; and (d) other matters 
concerning the court’s exercise of discretion. In essence, the English court’s task 
is to evaluate the justice of the case.  The Supreme Court rejected adopting the 
simple test of a causative mistake that is applicable to claims for mistaken 
payment in the law of unjust enrichment (thereby also rejecting fusion of law 
and equity in this context).  The decision has spawned endless controversy (see, 
for example, B Häcker, “Mistaken Gifts after Pitt v Holt” (2014) 67 CLP 333). 
 
Finally, and pertaining to registered land, how the setting aside of the transfer 
for mistake impacts the principle indefeasibility of title under the Torrens 
system is an important issue.  Section 46(1) of the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, Rev 
Ed 2004) sets out various limits to the indefeasbility of (registered) title, 
including the Registrar’s power to correct errors in the land-register under 
section 159 as well as rectification of land-register by the courts on certain 
grounds under section 160.   But neither section 159 nor section 160 appears to 
apply in the context of the transferor’s own mistake. Leading local 
commentators have argued that section 159 should be interpreted to pertain 
only to the correction of errors on the part of the Land Registry, that is, 
departmental errors (see Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law, 
3rd Edn,  (LexisNexis, 2009) pp 290-291).  As for section 160, the provision 
cannot be invoked unless the registered proprietor is a party to the mistake or 
has caused the mistake (see section 160(2) and United Overseas Bank Ltd v 
Bebe bte Mohammad [2006] 4 SLR 884).   
 
It also appears that the transferor’s mistake as to the nature/effect of the 
transaction does not fall within any of the exceptions set out under section 
46(2), which reads: 
 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be held to prejudice the rights 
and remedies of any person — 
 
(a) to have the registered title of a proprietor defeated on the 
ground of fraud or forgery to which that proprietor or his agent 
was a party or in which he or his agent colluded; 
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(b) to enforce against a proprietor any contract to which that 
proprietor was a party; 
 
(c) to enforce against a proprietor who is a trustee the provisions 
of the trust; 
 
(d) to recover from a proprietor land acquired by him from a 
person under a legal disability which was known to the 
proprietor at the time of dealing; or 
 
(e) to recover from a proprietor land which has been unlawfully 
acquired by him in purported exercise of a statutory power or 
authority. 
 
The greatest hope lies outside of the statutory regime - by arguing that such a 
claim is an in personamexception to the principle of indefeasibility.   The 
existence of in personam exceptions was clearly endorsed by Lord Wilberforce 
in the Privy Council case of Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569 at 585, although 
the local Court of Appeal decision in Bebe favoured a restrictive approach to the 
recognition of such exceptions.  The subject remains mired in uncertainty.  Low 
has nevertheless persuasively argued that these exceptions and the principle of 
indefeasibility operate on different planes (see K Low, “The Nature of Torrens 
Indefeasibility: Understanding the Limits of ‘Personal Equities’ [2009] 33 
MULR 205). In his account, the principle of indefeasibility offers protection 
against claims based on prior title, whereas the in personam exceptions admit 
claims that are independent of prior title.  It follows, on Low’s rationalisation, 
that restitution on the basis of mistake should fall within the exceptions (see 
[2009 33 MULR 205 at 225-228).    Mak Saw Ching thus offers an opportunity 
for the Court of Appeal to revisit Bebe as well as provide further clarification on 
the subject ofin personam exceptions.  
 
In light of the interesting issues that might be discussed by the Court of Appeal, 
one awaits the appellate judgment with great anticipation.  
 
 
Yip Man (Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University) 
 
 
* This blog entry may be cited as Yip Man, "The Presumption of Resulting Trust: A 
New Era?", Singapore Law Blog (24 November 2014) 
(http://www.singaporelawblog.sg/blog/article/59) 
